Pandering in a Flexible Representative Democracy
Published in UAI, 2023
Flexible Representative Democracy is much more resilient to pandering candidates/representatives than traditional Representative Democracy
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Publications
This page only includes publications in conferences and journals. Additional working papers are sometimes available on arXiv.
In the Beginning there were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution
Published in ADT, 2021
An axiomatic approach to founding and amending constitutions
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Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice
Published in ADT, 2021
How groups fork and merge based on their preferences over alternatives and how many others join them.
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Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choice
Published in WINE, 2019
Even a small amount of cardinal preference information (in the form of preference intensities) can greatly reduce metric distortion.
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Flexible Representative Democracy
Published in IJCAI, 2018
Introducing Flexible Representative Democracy
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Utilitarians Without Utilities: Maximizing Social Welfare for Graph Problems using only Ordinal Preferences
Published in AAAI, 2017
This paper describes a class of problems where the goal is to form a subgraph from the edges of a graph, subject to a set of constraints, such that the sum of edge weights is maximized. The key difficulty is that the edge weights are unknown.
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